09 May 2013

In the long run we are all in trouble - The Absolute Return Letter, May 2013


In the long run we are all dead, said Keynes. Maybe so, but we could be in trouble long before then. Investors appear preoccupied with central bank policy. We argue that investors are quite right in keeping their eye on the ball but, to us, it looks as if they are focusing on the wrong ball. The real worries for the long term are demographics and negative real interest rates and the effect these factors may have on equity returns.

-- 
Regards

TBVF - Q4FY13 Result Update - Centrum


Talwalkars Better Value Fitness
Rating: Buy

Target Price: Rs266

CMP: Rs155

Upside: 72%
Performance above expectations
TBVF posted better than expected Q4FY13 results with net sales at Rs498mn on the back of increasing traction in ZUMBA and weight loss program ‘Reduce’ which helped the company increase its same store sales growth. Price hike in the annual August scheme coupled with new fitness studios further boosted sales. Margin expansion of 122bps on the back of cost control helped the company post 33.7% YoY increase in operating profit, 19.6% above our expectations. Adj PAT was up by 32% YoY to Rs121mn. We maintain a strong BUY on the stock.
m  Q4FY13 results beat estimates: TBVL posted net sales of Rs498mn (up 30.7% YoY), 4.3% above our estimates on the back of strong traction in new services, increasing same store sales growth and opening of fitness centers. Operating margins expanded by a healthy 122bps on a consolidated basis on the back of tightly controlled admin & other expenses which grew by mere 17.2% YoY. Operating profit was up by 33%YoY (19.6% above our estimates) to Rs279mn while PAT was high at Rs121mn, up 32% YoY. For FY13 the company posted revenues of Rs1509mn (up 26.4%YoY), operating profit of Rs726mn (up 34% YoY) with margin expansion of 263bps and Adj PAT of Rs301mn (up 38.5%YoY).
m  Focus on increasing same store sales growth: New initiatives such as Zumba®, Reduce and NuForm have helped the company leverage on its current assets and enhance member base. The higher pricing for new initiatives compared to existing services is helping the company yield higher margins and increase RoCE. By FY14 the company is confident of opening 100 Zumba® centers from 29 centers currently and introduce Reduce programs in 75 fitness centers from 17 centers now. The company currently has over 150 certified Zumba® trainers with large corporates including MNCs opting for Zumba® program and Nuform. For Reduce, the member base has widened to over 500 with the product being offered as “Home based Reduce”, primarily catering to HNIs and corporates at their door step.
m  Gym expansion plans on track: During the quarter the company started 7 new fitness centers of which 6 were owned, and one under Hi-fi. For FY14, the management expects to open 20-30 fitness centres with most of them owned taking the total gym count to 207 by 2015E. New gyms opened in tier II and III cities have received positive response from customers reflecting strong latent demand. 
m  Margins continue to expand: During the quarter operating margins expanded by 122bps to 55.9% as the company maintained tight control on expenses. Admin & other expenses grew by mere 17.2% while employee cost was up by 48.3% on the back of newly recruited Zumba trainers and marketing for Reduce. We expect the margins to expand by 137bps in FY14E to 49.5% on the back of high operating leverage from new services such as Zumba and Reduce which have high margins.
m  Other highlights: During the quarter the company launched online Shop site for Zumba merchandising, nutritional supplements, Talwalkars fitness accessories and gift vouchers. D/E for FY13 has been reduced to 0.75 from 1 in FY12 while the company has been able to reduce debtors’ days to 43 from 62. The management maintains it will become free cash flow positive by FY14 end.
m  Maintain BUY: We have increased our FY14/FY15 operating profit by 5.3%/9.5% on the back of higher margins from new services such as Reduce & Zumba while PAT has been increased by 5% for FY15E on the back of higher operating profit. TBVF is currently trading at 9.06x FY14E and 6.51x FY15E EPS of Rs17.1 and Rs23.8 respectively. We continue to value the stock at 13x Sept 2014 and increase our target price of Rs266.

FII & DII trading activity on NSE, BSE and MCX-SX 09-05-2013

CategoryBuySellNet
ValueValueValue
FII2249.431586.55
662.88
DII736.231212.92
-476.69

 


-- 

FII DERIVATIVES STATISTICS FOR 09-May-2013


FII DERIVATIVES STATISTICS FOR 09-May-2013
 
 
 BUYSELLOPEN INTEREST AT THE END OF THE DAY 
 No. of contractsAmt in CroresNo. of contractsAmt in CroresNo. of contractsAmt in Crores 
INDEX FUTURES414711264.5230740937.5546632014144.19326.97
INDEX OPTIONS3255379776.373122979412.17183474055585.72364.20
STOCK FUTURES539811603.08623481846.7692818926420.87-243.67
STOCK OPTIONS467191359.29509861457.531053743098.57-98.24
      Total349.26
 


-- 

Financial Planning :: Business Line


Wheat prices face downtrend pressure :: Business Line


Wells Fargo’s banking recipe :: Business Line


The US bank operates on the principle of focusing on core banking activities rather that fee-related and trading activities.
Wells Fargo is one of the few banks that was able to keep its head above water during the mortgage crisis that took down many of the others in the US. This is surprising, given that it is one of the largest mortgage lenders (home loans) in the US.
Of course, it is easy to lay the credit in the lap of the US Government which forced large banks such as Wells Fargo to compulsorily accept financial aid to bolster their balance-sheets.
But people in the banking circle know that Wells Fargo would have survived even without the Government’s largesse. Today, Wells Fargo is one of the most valuable banks (by market cap) in the US and probably one of the safest too.
During the height of the financial crisis in the US, John Stumpf, CEO of Wells Fargo, made a pertinent comment. He said: “It’s interesting that the industry (banking) has invented new ways to lose money when the old ways seemed to work just fine”.
His statement, albeit funny, highlights a few important aspects of banking. First, banking is by nature a risky business; second, it is the job of banks to minimise credit loss in the process of pursuing profits; third, it is safer to stick to the knitting in terms of the business model rather than be too adventurous.
Here are a few insights from Wells Fargo’s success that can be used as a checklist to evaluate any bank.
Traditional business model: At the core, banking is about earning a spread between what it pays to depositors and what it charges borrowers. Of course, there is a whole gamut of fee-related and trading activities that banks indulge in to augment their net interest margins (spreads).
However, these are best viewed as toppings on the cake. Wells Fargo operates on the philosophy that one can’t risk the cake for the topping.
High CASA ratio: Current and savings deposits (CASA) are the cheapest source of funds available to banks. Banks that are able to garner a high proportion of their total funds in the form of CASA, have low cost of funds.
For the same interest income earned, banks that have high CASA ratio incur lower interest expenses and, therefore, earn higher net interest margins (spreads).
This provides them the flexibility to restrict their lending to relatively ‘safer products’ and ‘safer customers’, because, thanks to their low cost of funds, even a reasonable interest income can earn them healthy spreads.
On the other hand, banks with high cost of funds are forced, in some manner, to indulge in riskier lending in search of higher interest income and fees, because that is the only way in which they can compensate for the high cost of funds and still attain healthy spreads. Banks with low cost of funds typically have a CASA ratio in the range of 50 per cent of their total funds.
Low cost-to-income ratio: This can be perceived as the inverse of operating efficiency in banking terms. The ratio is computed as operating costs divided by total income (net interest income or spread + fee income).
Again, similar to the cost of funds argument above, banks with low cost-to-income ratio, have low operating expenditure (that is, branch cost, personnel cost, and so on) and, hence, can translate a larger portion of their income into profit.
The thumb rule in banking is to attain a cost-to-income ratio less than 50 per cent — the lower, the better.
Consumer and small and medium business oriented: On the lending side, banks that provide smaller loans to a larger number of clients are generally better off in terms of diversification and risk mitigation.
Such banks focus on retail customers (individuals) and small and medium businesses (SMB) rather than large corporate, infrastructure finance, and so on.
More products for the right customers: Wells Fargo is predominantly a consumer and SMB bank that develops deep relationships with its customers so that it has a comprehensive view of their financial profile, which it in turn uses to deliver appropriate financial products.
This model reduces cost of delivery by providing multiple products per customer relationship and enabling the bank to grow along with the customer. It also reduces risk by being able to build a business around customers that have displayed good track record.
Low LTV asset-backed lending: Safer banks have a larger portion of their loan portfolio backed by assets, for example, home loans. But merely having underlying assets doesn’t make the loans less risky, especially given that asset bubbles have become so common these days.
What’s also essential is skin in the game for the borrower in the form of down payment (margin) requirement.
This is measured through a LTV ratio — average loan amount to value of underlying assets.
Lower the LTV ratio, more the skin in the game for borrowers and safer the loan portfolio. Average LTV of more than 80 per cent is typically a risky play.
Beware of sub-prime: Sub-prime loans generally indicate higher risk. Of course, they also provide an opportunity for the banks to charge much higher interest rates but many a time the risk ends up subsuming the rewards, like what happened during the US mortgage crisis.
Lower the share of sub-prime loans in the lending portfolio of a bank — the safer it is.
For a bank like Wells Fargo, less than 2 per cent of their current residential mortgage loan servicing portfolio is sub-prime.
Back in India, NBFCs such as Shriram Transport Finance have been able to prove that even the subprime segment can be safe and profitable if handled the right way, but that’s a story for another day.
Minimal proprietary trading: Lastly, banks inevitably have to engage in trading to accommodate investment/transaction activities of customers and execute economic hedging to manage certain balance-sheet risks.
But proprietary trading, where the bank uses its own capital purely for speculation, is the most risky.
While there are few investment banks that make outsize gains from their proprietary desks, when things do not go well, these same activities can produce outsize losses that could potentially pull down the bank.