03 September 2011

3 Sept: IPO and NCD GMP; Gray Market Preimum

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Company Name
Offer Price (Rs)
Expected Listing Price Premium



Vaswani Ind.
52
Discount
Brooks Lab.
100
5 to 6
SRS Ltd.
58
 1 to 2
T. D. Power Systems
256
Discount
Manappuram Finance
1000
Discount
Muthoot Finance
1000
0.5%


HDFC Bank: Absolute upside; upgrade to ADD::Kotak Sec,

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HDFC Bank (HDFCB)
Banks/Financial Institutions
Absolute upside; upgrade to ADD. We see limited concerns relating to the banks
business model and believe HDFC Bank is well positioned to deliver 28-30% earnings
growth for FY2011-13E. Higher provisions will drive earnings in FY2012E but we expect
the normalization of revenues to drive earnings in FY2013E. The stock is currently
trading at 3X FY2013E book and 16X EPS delivering RoEs of 18-19% levels. Upgrade to
ADD (from REDUCE) with an upside of 20% (no change in TP).


Limited concerns regarding near-term earnings growth; upgrade to ADD
We upgrade HDFC Bank to ADD (from REDUCE) earlier -- our upgrade is driven by the recent price
correction. We maintain our target price at Rs560 valuing the bank at 3.8X FY2013E book and
20X EPS. We expect the premium multiples to be maintained given the limited risk to its
retail/working capital loan book, consistent earnings growth and comfort on the liability franchise.
Our ADD rating is driven by the fact that we do see other banks offering better risk-reward tradeoffs
at current levels. We believe that HDFC Bank’s balance sheet is well positioned to deliver RoEs
in the range of 18-19% and 28% EPS growth for FY2011-13E. At current levels, the stock is
trading at 3X FY2013E book and 16X EPS and offers an upside of 20%.
Earnings growth driven by lower provisions; revenue growth to remain under pressure in FY2012E
We broadly maintain our earnings and expect 28% earnings CAGR for FY2011-13E. FY2012E
would see earnings growth driven by lower provisions with subdued revenue growth (18% levels)
on the back of margin moderation and lower fee income. However, FY2011 saw the bank making
higher provisions for (1) improving coverage ratio to 83% (from 78%) (2) Rs6.7 bn (50 bps of
loans) of floating provisions (3) contingent provisions for MFI, change in accounting for MTM
(client related) and certain CBoP related expenses.
Liability franchise to remain a key strength; continues to gain market share
We maintain our positive outlook on HDFC Bank’s business, especially its low-cost deposit
franchise, which remains strong at 49% levels, on the back of its strong branch franchise in critical
centers as well as the strength of its delivery platform. Of the 25 banks that we have used for our
analysis, we find HDFC Bank has been able to consistently improve its market share across the
years.
No near-term concern on asset quality beyond cyclical rise in slippages
We see limited concerns regarding the asset quality of the bank. Its retail book is seeing slippages
at historic low levels and is yet to show any serious stress signals. We expect slippages to rise
(driven from cyclical events) to 1.7% levels by FY2013E from 1.1% levels in FY2011 and broadly
factor higher provisions at 1.1% levels.

Buy SUN TV NETWORK :: TARGET PRICE: RS.391 ::Kotak Sec,

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SUN TV NETWORK
PRICE: RS.303 RECOMMENDATION: BUY
TARGET PRICE: RS.391 FY12E P/E: 13.6X
In a status report submitted to the Supreme Court on Thursday, the CBI has reportedly
said that there is no evidence that Mr. Dayanidhi Maran used coercive tactics
to force Mr. C Sivasankaran to sell Aircel Ltd to Maxis Communications. However,
the agency's counsel has told the court that investigations would continue since
there was evidence to suggest that there was a deliberate delay in granting of license
to Aircel.
The issue is of importance to Sun TV Network stock. News of alleged wrong-doing
in the deal, coupled with Maxis' purchase of a stake in Sun Direct, the DTH entity
promoted by Mr. Kalanithi Maran (promoter of Sun TV), is behind the severe de-rating
that Sun TV has witnessed in the past eight months.
Although we are in no position to understand whether CBI shall eventually gather
enough evidence, we believe that the current news-flow is a positive for Sun TV, in
that CBI has no evidence as of now of alleged quid pro quo between Maxis and Mr.
Maran/ relatives'. As per media reports, the CBI is set to interrogate Mr. Dayanidhi
Maran and Mr. T. Ananda Krishnan, the promoter of Maxis, in the next fortnight.
The CBI status report is the first positive piece of news that Sun TV Network stock
has received in a fairly long time.
We have so far held the view that although Sun TV Network assets should be valued
aggressively, the overhang of investigations underway could have a negative impact
on the stock. The same was the key factor that motivated our downgrade (to ACCUMULATE)
on Sun TV Network. We believe the current news-flow is incrementally
positive for Sun TV Network.
The stock is trading at 13.6x PER FY12, at the lower end of its five year PER band.
Our prior price target, Rs 342, accounted for a 30% discount to fair value of Sun TV
Network (we see fair value of operations of the company at Rs 489/share). On the
back of the fresh CBI status report, we see reason to apply a lower discount to our
fair value. We reduce the discount, which has been incorporated to take into account
investor fears/ apprehensions regarding ongoing investigations, to 20% from
30% earlier, and we raise our price target on Sun TV Network to Rs 391 (Rs 342
earlier). We upgrade the stock to BUY.
We caution investors that Sun TV remains a high-risk, high reward opportunity, and
the stock may be extremely volatile based on incoming news-flow on the investigations
that are underway. Weaker than expected advertising environment and loss of
competitive position remain the other key risks, although we believe risks related
with operations are well-contained due to strong grip of the company over
viewership in most markets, and the relatively concentrated status of industry in regional
markets.


Hold Sesa Goa; Target : Rs 221 ::ICICI Securities,

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A d v e r s e   i m p a c t   o f   m i n in g   b a n   i n   K a  r n a t a k a …
The Supreme Court on July 30 had imposed a mining ban in the Bellary
region of Karnataka citing extensive damage to the environment due to
illegal mining of resources. On Friday, the Supreme Court extended this
mining ban in the areas of Tumkur and Chitradurga districts of Karnataka,
based on the report by the Central Empowered Committee (CEC), which
cited that environment has been largely impacted due to mining activity
in these regions. Combined mining from both these regions has an output
of ~9-10 million tonnes (MT) and it contributed to ~a quarter of the total
states output. Sesa Goa has one mine (A Narrain mine sales stood around
~1 MT in Q1FY12) operation in Chitradurga, which after the application of
this ban ceased to operate. This is negative for Sesa Goa as this mine
produced higher grade ore as compared to its Goa mines.
ƒ Reduction in our volume assumption
The management was optimistic of starting and ramping up operations
from Karnataka in the current fiscal. However, in light of the current
events we do not expect any contribution from Karnataka for FY12. We
have revised our sales volume estimates down by ~21% to 15.1 MT in
FY12E and ~16% dip in FY13E to 16.8 MT.
V a l u a t i o n
At the CMP of | 213, the stock is trading at 6.5x and 5.6x its FY12E and
FY13E EV/EBITDA, respectively. We believe that this ban will continue
for at least the next six months.  Hence, volume growth will remain
under pressure. Another concern for the stock is the overhang of
implementation of new mining bill that will have a negative impact on
the profitability of the company to a larger extent. Hence, we continue
to value the stock on an SOTP basis, valuing the core business at 4x
EV/EBITDA multiple. We have assigned a 30% holding company
discount to investment value at the current market price in Cairn India,
thus arriving at a target price of | 221 and assigned a HOLD rating to it.

DEN Networks: Content advantage 􀂃:: Macquarie Research

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DEN Networks: Content advantage
􀂃 We met with the management of DEN Networks (DEN IN) to understand the
outlook for the Indian cable players, the business drivers of the company, and
its positioning vs. the offerings of other vendors.
􀂃 DEN Networks was founded in July, 2007 by Mr. Sameer Manchanda, who
has over 20 years of experience in media and channel distribution.
Key differentiator: Star DEN channel distribution JV
􀂃 JV provides content advantage. In 2008, the company formed a JV with
Star India to exclusively distribute all the broadcaster’s channels to different
platforms (i.e. Cable and DTH operators). This JV accounts for ~50% of the
consolidated revenue but only 10% of the EBITDA given the low pass-through
margins in the TV channel distribution business. This JV helps the company in
its Cable business given Star’s leading position in key TV genres.
􀂃 Partnership with arch rival to address leakage. In May 2011, Star DEN
announced the formation of a 50-50 Joint Venture with Zee Turner (the TV
channel distribution JV of Zee Entertainment and Turner). The arch rivals in
the TV channel distribution business came together to jointly market 68
channels. The JV has been in force since July 2011 but we expect to see the
financial performance of this JV only in FY13 across the ecosystem.
Dominant cable operator: potential threat from DTH
􀂃 Large subs base but largely analogue. DEN has about 10m subscribers
across 80+ cities. Its key markets are Delhi, Uttar Pradesh and Karnataka
followed by a presence in certain cities in Maharashtra (including Mumbai),
Gujarat, Rajasthan, Haryana, West Bengal and Kerala. The existing subs
base is largely analogue with only 700k subscribers on the digital platform.
􀂃 Leader in LCO consolidation. It has acquired and integrated 80+ MSOs
since inception and offers digital cable in 45+ cities.
IPO cash balance: Reason for strength of expansion
􀂃 IPO funding has strengthened the balance sheet. DEN had its IPO in Nov
2009 and raised Rs3.6bn. The company currently has cash of Rs2bn on the
balance sheet and debt of Rs1.25bn. The net cash position is sufficient to
fund free set-top boxes for 0.625m subscribers.
Risks and Valuation
􀂃 A play on digitisation but prefer DTH. Den is riding the digitisation wave in
the Indian TV distribution industry. Even so, we believe the company’s growth
forecasts are predicated on government strictly sticking to the analogue
sunset clause. We believe DTH players that have demonstrated consumer
pull are better placed than the digital cable industry in India.
􀂃 Steep correction results in trough valuation. Management expects FY12
EBITDA of Rs1,400m, implying an FY12E EV/EBITDA of 2.9x based on the
current share price. The biggest risk to the business model is potential
pressure on the carriage and placement fees that comprise ~27% of
consolidated revenues.

Conversations with investors; INR down 4% against USD is positive for Indian Metals ::JPMorgan

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 Who is less bearish: Generally over the last 2 weeks our conversations with
investors indicate that on the margin, local Indian funds are relatively less
bearish than their foreign counterparts on Indian Metals and Mining (MM)
equities. For example, on our recent TATA Steel many foreign investors
argued that our worst case assumption for TATA ($250/MT EBITDA in India
and $20/MT at Europe) was far too optimistic, while local investors were not as
bearish. Arguably it could also be driven by lower redemption issues at the local
funds (we do not have multiple data points to prove this conjecture). For
example, as per Bloomberg, state insurance company, LIC, acquired 0.94Mn
shares in TATA in August 12th, taking the stake to 14.06%.
 Why are India MM equities falling more than the regional/global peers?
Indian MM equities have sharply underperformed global and regional peers. For
example, TATA initially declined in-sync with European/US Steel companies,
and even when the latter saw some upward movement, TATA continued to fall
with volumes increasing. HNDL which has 60% of EBITDA not exposed to
LME, has sharply underperformed peers, and similar to TATA in recent days,
the large declines have come on higher volumes. In our view there are 2 possible
reasons for this underperformance: a) India YTD has underperformed most of
the Asian markets (down 21%) and b) There are decently large ETF holdings in
many of the frontline Indian MM equities as per Bloomberg holding data.
Additionally as we have highlighted in our FII v/s DII ownership patters,
HNDL had the highest level of FII ownership through this year so far, while
TATA saw increased FII ownership post the equity issuance earlier this
year. We believe some of the sharp underperformance, particularly of
TATA/HNDL can be attributed to possible ETF led selling and relatively large
FII ownership.
 Currencies become important again: Since the equity sell off started, INR has
depreciated by 4% (from end July). For Indian MM companies which work
on import parity model, this is equivalent to a 4% increase in underlying
commodity price. We would watch this very closely as on balance currency
depreciation against the USD is positive for Indian MM companies.
 2008 v/s 2011: Compared to the declines in Base, bulks have held up so far.
Looking at the 2008 crash, LME copper started to fall from August 2008 (peak
price of $7169/MT) and over the next 45 days fell 15% (15th Sept 2008), then
stabilized for some days, after which the crash picked up pace and LME copper
fell 46% over the next 30 days (25th Oct 2008) after which it stabilized again for
some days and the last 25% fall to hit trough price of $2835/MT was over 2
month period (24th Dec 2008). Spot iron ore in the first phase of correction
did not fall till August 25th 2008 and then over the next 20 days fell 27%.
The fall in spot iron ore increased and spot prices fell 50% over the next 2
months to hit a low of $65/MT in Nov 2008 and after that prices started to
increase. So far in 2011, LME copper in eerily similar timelines like 2008,
started falling from August 1st and is down 11% so far. Spot iron ore prices
have moved up 1% in the same timeframe. Admittedly bulks are less liquid
than base, and hence a correction could happen over a shorter period of
time on actual transactions, however compared to 2008, India’s exports are
significantly lower, while China’s imports are much higher (334MT in
H1CY11 v/s 230MT in H1 2008).

India’s sizzling export growth: debunking the conspiracy theories: ::JPMorgan

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India’s sizzling export growth: debunking the conspiracy theories

 
 
  • &#9679 India’s export growth has sizzled over the last year, and continues to do so, despite the recent slowing in developed markets and rising global uncertainty
  • &#9679 However, India’s export story is increasingly being questioned by skeptics who have begun to cast aspersions on the credibility of the export data
  • &#9679 Specifically, they allege that India’s export data is not consistent either with partner country import data or with port traffic data in India
  • &#9679 We, therefore, systematically analyze India’s bilateral trade data over the last decade as well as compare it to port traffic data
  • &#9679 In contrast to the conspiracy theorists, we find no evidence that the data is being fudged
  • &#9679 While trade data discrepancies have always existed, and exist for virtually all other countries, discrepancies have actually reduced in 2010 and 2011 when India's exports began to surge
  • &#9679 Furthermore, India’s export growth is not inconsistent with growth of port traffic data, unlike what is commonly presumed
  • &#9679 Instead, India’s recent export buoyancy can be explained quite simply by the fact that a vast majority of India’s exports are now directed to developing countries where activity remains more buoyant than developed markets
 
Exports have been India’s silver lining amid the gloom…
 
India has been beset with macroeconomic challenges over the last year. With inflation continuing to remain stubbornly high month after month, no signs yet that the private investment cycle is poised to take off, markets and policymakers are bracing for a significant policy-induced slowing of economic activity – as the only viable means to quell entrenched inflationary pressures.
 
In the midst of this domestic doom and gloom, what has stood out for its consistently sizzling performance over the last year, is India’s export growth. Exports began to surge toward the middle of last year as global activity ticked up and grew a whopping 38% (in value terms) over the last fiscal. Despite slowing growth in some developed markets in the first half of 2011 and rising global uncertainty, exports have continued to grow buoyantly, averaging a stunning 55% (in value terms) in the first four months of this fiscal. For the longest time, skeptics were convinced that the export buoyancy was on account of the feared withdrawal of a domestic export subsidy scheme and therefore would not sustain. To their surprise, exports have continued to surge month after month.
 
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What this consistently impressive export performance has done is to induce a moderation of the trade and current account deficit (CAD) in the last fiscal (the CAD fell to 2.6% of GDP in FY11 from 2.9% in FY10) and thereby prop up the INR despite surging crude prices over the last year.
 
….but questions on data credibility have taken off the sheen
 
However, the sheen of India’s remarkable export performance over the last year has been consistently eroded by a growing chatter questioning both the plausibility of India’s export story as well as the veracity of the export data itself.
 
On the plausibility front, skeptics are quick to point out that India’s export performance over the last 2 quarters looks implausibly strong given that growth and economic activity has slowed considerably in key developed markets such as the United States and the Euro Area.
 
On the veracity of the data, itself, the allegations are more specific. They mainly comprise two strands: (i) that India’s recorded exports to our trading partners are significantly higher than the corresponding imports from India that those countries record; and (ii) that growth of container traffic at ports is significantly lower than what should be implied by the export numbers. The resulting implication being that India’s export story is not for real and that the numbers are being fudged.
 
To judge the merits of these allegations we used the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) – the most comprehensive and widely accepted data source on bilateral trade – to study India’s bilateral trade patterns over the last decade. We also looked more closely at the container traffic from various Indian ports and compared them to export volume data from GDP statistics to see if they match up. So what did this analysis throw up?
 
There is no trade data discrepancy at a regional level
 
First off, there is no discrepancy – at a regional level -- between the recorded imports from India and India’s reported exports to countries in those regions. Specifically, for the world as whole and for each individual region, for all of calendar 2010 and the first quarter of 2011 (the last point for which data is available), recorded imports from India are greater than India’s exports to those regions. This is to be expected since imports are typically computed on a cif basis (including the costs of insurance and freight) whereas exports are expected to be lower because they are computed on a fob basis (sans these costs).
 
In sum, for the calendar year 2010 and the 1Q2011 there is not a single region where India’s recorded exports are higher than the partner region’s recorded imports.
 
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Bilateral trade data discrepancies have existed since time immemorial…
 
Are there individual trading partners for which these discrepancies exists (i.e. when recorded imports from a country are lower than the exports recorded by India to that country)? Absolutely. But this is not a phenomenon that started in 2010 when India’s exports began to surge. It has existed across all countries (not just India) and for time immemorial. As the IMF DOTS manual itself acknowledges, some discrepancies are to be expected given the different ways in which countries report their trade (differences in classification concepts and detail, time of recording, valuation, and coverage, as well as processing errors).
 
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….and fell, not rose, in 2010 !
 
If one is to believe the contention that India’s export numbers are being fudged, what we should observe is that the number of cases in which India’s recorded exports are higher than that reported by our trading partners should shoot up in 2010 and early 2011 during the time when recorded exports surged.
 
Instead, we observe exactly the opposite. Not only have the discrepancies always existed, but they fell to an all-time low in 2010. Specifically, among India’s 181 trading partners for which data is available, 25 percent of them recorded imports from India that were lower than India’s recorded exports to them in 2002. By 2009, this discrepancy had fallen to 14 percent and in 2010 the discrepancy was below 10 percent.
 
This pattern is consistent even on a quarterly basis. Discrepencies in 4Q2010 when the export surge began is limited to just 10 percent of the trading partners and consistent with earlier quarters of the year. Exports surged further in 1Q2011 but, in contrast, data discrepancies fell to just 3 percent of the countries (though this new data will likely be revised)
 
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This phenomenon exists in other countries too: the case of Brazil
 
Furthermore, and as alluded to above, these discrepancies are not limited to just India but true of a vast majority of countries covered in the DOTS.
 
For the sake of comparison, therefore, we decided to conduct the same analysis for Brazil. Unsurprisingly, bilateral trade discrepancies exist there too and, in fact, are even worse. Back in 2002, Brazil’s discrepancies existed with about 22 % of its 183 trading partners – almost identical to that of India. And, while these have reduced over the decade, the discrepancies moderated much less than in India. As such, by 2010 Brazil’s data discrepancies still existed with 18% of its trading partners – almost double that of India. In sum, there’s nothing particularly unusual about India’s data discrepancies that warrant the kind of conspiracy theories that are abound.
 
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The repeat offenders
 
Giving credence to the view that these bilateral discrepancies exist, in part, on account of the differing manner in which countries report trade patterns, is the fact that most of the countries that are repeat offenders exist in Africa or states that belonged to the former Soviet Republic. This suggests that the trade reporting systems (classification concepts and detail, valuation and coverage) are likely structurally different from India in these countries, leading to the same recurrent patterns of trade discrepancies.
 
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Guess what: port container traffic data is not inconsistent with the export growth data
 
In addition to bilateral trade discrepancies, skeptics point to the fact that India’s sizzling merchandise export growth over the last year is not reflected in commensurate growth of port-traffic through which the vast majority of our exports are routed.
 
This is because they mistakenly compare export value data (nominal) with port container tonnage and volume data (real). It is important to underscore that the 38% sizzling export growth witnessed in FY11 was in value terms, which includes price effects. Given the sharp increase in commodity prices last year, one would expect a significant price effect at play. It is therefore important to impute the growth in export volumes and compare that to the growth of container traffic.
 
Expenditure side GDP data reveals that real export growth was 18% last year in FY11. However, this contains both exports of manufactures and services. While there is not enough granularity available in the GDP data to disaggregate the two, anecdotal evidence suggests that volume growth of IT and BPO service exports (which constitutes the bulk of India’s service exports) was also broadly in this range. Given this, assuming 18% growth of merchandise export volumes is not a bad proxy. The other issue to contend with is that GDP real growth may overstate the growth of volumes if there are quality/technology improvements which contribute to value-add, but we will abstract from those issues for now. FY11 GDP data also indicates that gross imports grew at 9% in FY11, such that total trade volumes (on a weighted average basis) grew close to 13 % in FY11.
 
How does this compare to increases in container tonnage at ports? Very well, actually. The growth in container tonnage (both exports and imports combined, since the breakdown is not available) was almost identical at 12.6 % for the 12 large government controlled ports in the country (controlling about 65 % of the traffic). Some newer privately run ports (controlling another 10 percent of the traffic) showed significantly higher growth in container tonnage (25-30 %) for the last fiscal. In sum, the growth of trade volumes last fiscal was not at all inconsistent with the increase in container traffic growth – in contrast to what is routinely, and casually, assumed.
 
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Shed the conspiracy theories: it’s new products and markets, silly!
 
Instead of relying upon conspiracy theories – which are not supported by the data -- India’s buoyant export performance over the last year can be explained much more simply – a move to newer markets and newer products over the last few years.
 
Key to the skepticism about India’s export performance is the disconnect between slowing growth in the US and euro area on the one hand and India’s continued export buoyancy on the other. But this can be explained quite easily. Contrary to conventional wisdom, India’s exports to developed markets has fallen appreciably over the last decade. Specifically, more than 55% of India’s exports was directed to advanced economies in 2000. A decade later, however, advanced economies account for just over a third of India’s exports. Instead, the vast majority of India’s exports are now directed to other developing countries (particularly in Asia) as well as OPEC countries. The growth slowdown in these economies has been far less pronounced than in the developed markets.
 
 
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Similarly, the structural composition of what India exports has changed sharply. India’s conventional exports (leather, textiles, gems) have been increasingly replaced by the higher valued- added manufacturing exports including engineering goods, pharmaceuticals and chemical products which now account for the bulk of the export basket. These are shown to have a far greater sensitivity to changes in global demand – in contrast to India’s traditional exports – and, therefore, it is not surprising to see sharp growth in these sectors over the last year as growth in the new export markets has remained strong
 
 
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Summing it all up: the proof of the pudding is in the eating
 
In sum, allegations that India’s export numbers are being fudged are inconsistent both with partner country data as well as with port traffic data in India. Furthermore, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. If indeed, the export numbers were being cooked, then the observed correlations between exports and other macroeconomic variables in India (IP, inflation) which have risen in recent years – as fast-growing exports increasingly strain industrial capacity and pressure core inflation – would have broken down, which is not the case. It is no co-incidence, for example, that core inflation surged in the first two quarters of 2011 – a time when domestic demand had begun to slow but export growth was surging. All told, instead of conjuring up more conspiracy theories, we should be celebrating the new-found dynamism of India’s export sector.
 
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Sept 2011: Shareholding Monitor: ICICI Securities,

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Promoters, public, FIIs and MFs are the major equity stakeholders in a listed
corporate entity. Of the stakeholders, FIIs have been major investors in Indian
corporates, as is evident from the accompanying chart (Exhibit 1) with their
holding in BSE 500 companies moving up from 10.2% in June 2009 to 12.5%
in June 2011. The optimism displayed by FIIs in the Indian corporate growth
story arises from the fact that the  Indian economy remained relatively
insulated from the global economic meltdown mostly on account of the
strong domestic consumption, thrust on infrastructure development and a
strong banking system. The resilience of the Indian economy reaffirmed the
faith of FII investors who have increased their holding in Indian companies.
After pulling out | 53,052 crore in CY08 during the global economic
meltdown, FIIs have invested | 85,368 crore in CY09 and | 1,34,294 crore in
CY10. Q1CY11 was characterised by a pre-Budget sell-off with FIIs being net
sellers to the tune of | 3100 crore while Q2CY11 has seen positive inflows to
the tune of | 5171 crore. FII holding has reduced by 0.3% in Q2CY11 with the
BSE 500 index correcting by 2.7% to 7265 level in June 2011 from 7464 level
in March 2011.  The BSE 500 index has exhibited a positive correlation with
the FII holding (Exhibit 2) while the role of other stakeholders has been
insignificant.


Most preferred sectors
• Banking
• Metals
• Construction and Infrastructure
Banking, undoubtedly, has  been the most favoured
sector of various stakeholders. The allocation to the
banking sector by all stakeholders is still below its
earlier peak allocation before the global meltdown.
Stakeholders have shown their faith in the Indian
banking system and there appears to be enough room
for higher allocation for  the banking sector, going
ahead…


FII equity investments
Our analysis of the equity investment  portfolio of FIIs reveals that banking
has been able to maintain its top allocation though the quantum has come
down from 13.2% in December 2008 to 9.7% in June 2011 after the global
meltdown in the second half of CY08. FIIs have shown faith in the Indian
consumption and infrastructure story as the FMCG, construction &
infrastructure and power sector have  seen higher allocation during the
period. The allocation to the scam embroiled telecom sector has risen
marginally from 4.4% in Q1CY11 to 4.5% in Q2CY11 after declining for six
consecutive quarters from a peak allocation of 6.5% in Q3CY09. The oil &
gas sector has seen a QoQ decline in allocation of 2.6%. Allocation to the
power sector, which had increased by 27% in Q4CY10 mainly on account of
FIIs investing in the  PowerGrid FPO in November 2010, has come down
from 8.9% in Q1CY11 to 8.5% in Q2CY11. The metal sector has maintained
its position as the second highest allocated sector in spite of a 2.3% QoQ
decline to 8.8%. The IT sector has been most stable in terms of allocation
whereas real estate, after the initial euphoria, continues to see lower
allocation.


MF equity investments
Contrary to FIIs, MFs were unable to have a significant impact on the
market owing to liquidity concerns relating to limited inflows and
redemption pressure. MF holdings in BSE 500 companies have remained
within a narrow range of 3.3-3.6% for the last nine quarters.
Banking, metals, construction & infrastructure and oil & gas have the
highest allocation in the mutual fund portfolio. Significant allocation has
been made in regulated sectors like power and oil & gas. Allocations to IT
and FMCG and capital goods have remained stable. Allocation to the
power and telecom sectors have increased ~ 5% QoQ while real estate,
auto, metals and constructions have seen a decline in the range of 5-25%.
Exposure to the real estate sector, which was 0.5% in Q1CY11, has
further reduced to 0.4% inQ2CY11.







We have analysed the investment pattern of the stakeholders for BSE 500
companies and calculated the allocation (percentage) of their equity
investment portfolio in various business segments. We have reviewed the
sectoral allocation made by these players over the last nine quarters to
gauge their sectoral preferences. Banking, metals and construction have got
the maximum allocation from the various stakeholders. In Q2CY11, FIIs
have maintained their exposure to  the banking and construction sector
while their exposure to the metals sector has gone down. MFs have
marginally increased their exposure  to banking while they have reduced
their exposure to the metals and construction sectors.

Dish TV India - Growth hinges on festive season :: Macquarie Research

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Dish TV India
Growth hinges on festive season
Event
􀂃 We re-assess our estimates for Dish TV for potential impact from slowing
GDP growth. We believe the company would be able to deliver strong subs
growth in FY12 albeit ARPU improvement would remain challenging. We have
retained our subs addition forecast but trimmed our ARPU forecast by 4%.
􀂃 Our revised TP as we roll forward to FY13 is Rs95 (from Rs90 earlier). Street
has aggressively raised estimates on the name and we would use the
potential earnings downgrade cycle to build position.
Impact
􀂃 DTH remains best poised TV distribution platform. In our thematic report,
Digitisation – The Golden Goose, 22 August 2011 we have argued that DTH
operators are best placed to monetize the attractive distribution opportunity in
the Indian media sector.
􀂃 Festive season performance crucial for outperformance. 30% of our full
year subs addition target for Dish is expected to happen in 3Q FY12.
Consumer sentiment during the festive season will determine the pace of
subs addition, in our view. We maintain that the potential for positive surprise
is higher for subs addition vs. ARPU improvement.
􀂃 FY12– another year of substantial subscriber growth. The Indian DTH
industry surprised us positively by adding 13m subscribers last year. Our
cable and satellite model expects another year of 13m gross additions, and
we expect Dish TV to repeat its FY11 performance by adding 3.5m gross
subs in FY12.
􀂃 Rate hike done in May. Management has outlined its FY12 ARPU target of
Rs160–165. We were pleasantly surprised by the company’s execution in
FY11 on the ARPU front but are reining in our bullish thoughts and limiting our
ARPU est. to Rs149 for FY12 (exit quarter ARPU of Rs158). We are now
building in only 1% QoQ improvement in ARPU in 2Q and 3Q (vs. 3% earlier).
Earnings and target price revision
􀂃 We would like to be conservative and cut our ARPU forecast by 4% to factor
in potential pressure from GDP slowdown. The impact of this on TP is partially
offset by roll forward of our valuation to March 2013.
Price catalyst
􀂃 12-month price target: Rs95.00 based on a DCF methodology.
􀂃 Catalyst: Sustained uptick in subscription ARPU for FY12.
Action and recommendation
􀂃 Street downgrade could provide better entry point. We think Dish is best
suited to take advantage of changing consumer media habits. Even so, our
current FY13e EBITDA is 10% below consensus and we would build position
when the street downgrade cycle plays out.

India Financials -Stick to Quality ::JPMorgan

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We stay cautious on Indian banks, despite the vicious correction this week.
The RBI pause isn't a done deal, and more importantly, significant growth
pressures are building up. We see wholesale asset quality staying weak
through FY13 (not just FY12), and recommend investors stick to quality.
Our preference stays with retail private banks.
 Rates have peaked? Not a done deal. We think there will be one or
two more rate hikes (totaling 50-75bp) and easing is unlikely before mid-
2012. This is driving significant growth challenges, and we see muted
GDP for the next 6-8 quarters. This adverse macro scenario should
affect pricing power and, hence, revenue growth, with pressures on
margins, loan demand and fees.
 IPPs remain a risk. The stress on IPPs persists due to poor coal
availability, weak sponsor finances and elevated SEB debt. The
important cue is forward regulatory movement (or lack thereof) –
substantial NPL recognition is unlikely before FY14, given the long
project execution timelines. We remain cautious on banks with high
power exposure, given the difficulty in solving some of the issues.
 Asset quality risks rising. Weak GDP growth should impact wholesale
asset quality across sectors. We also expect some slippage in SME
portfolios due to a weak global economy and rising rates. Our study of
quarterly interest cover indicates stress, and our heat map of asset quality
(page 2) shows PSU banks and wholesale private banks more vulnerable.
 Too early to play valuations. We think it’s too early to pick cheap
stocks, given earnings risk – the preference is to hide in resilience. Retail
banks would hold up better, given stable funding and better asset quality
outlook. HDFC, HDFC Bank, IndusInd and Kotak are our preferred
stocks – we remain cautious on all PSUs.


Investment summary
We remain underweight on Indian banks, with a clear preference for retail private
banks. Our key arguments are:
 We believe the rate cycle has not peaked, and there is scope for further rate hikes.
The only deterrent to the RBI would be a growth shock, in which case banks
would underperform anyway.
 We fear a hard landing in late CY12, spurred by high interest rates and global
weakness. FY13 could be the second successive year with <7.5% growth. (Our
view, not the formal view of the JPM economics team).
 The current macro environment should put pressure on revenue growth - with
loan demand, margins and fees all being hit. This will be compounded by asset
quality issues from wholesale borrowers, as indicated by falling interest cover
(Figures 9, 11 & 12).
Investment thesis
We prefer retail private banks as: a) margins will hold up better for retail-funded
banks and b) asset quality should be more resilient - we think the retail space faces
far lesser risk given the structural improvements in recent years (functioning credit
bureau, tighter credit standards, drying up of unsecured credit).

PSU Banks – continue to avoid
Valuations have corrected and they are trading at discounts to mean (see Chart 4) but
we think that the period of asset quality pain would extend through FY13. The
current delinquencies are merely the delayed impact of the FY10 restructuring - we
expect the stress from the current cycle to hit the sector hard in FY13.

Retail private banks – best picks
We prefer the retail private banks the most (the asset quality heat map says it all). As
the scatter below (Figure 3) shows, HDFC Bank, IndusInd and Kotak fall squarely
in the safety zone with relatively better asset and liability mix. We would add
HDFC, as its wholesale funding has never been an issue.
Wholesale private banks – be very selective
We think that these banks will hold up better than the PSU banks, despite similarities
in the asset book. We would be very selective in this space:
 ICICI Bank – it’s a bit of a force-fit into this category, given it has a significant
cushion with its large retail asset book. We remain very positive on the stock, but
believe that investors may have to look through some short term (~1 quarter)
pain.
 Axis Bank - It’s probably the least attractive of the private sector banks, given
margin pressures combined with the perception of weak asset quality.
 IDFC – IDFC needs a confluence of many positives for its business model to get
kick started again – falling interest rates, a robust equity market, a more amenable
regulatory environment for infrastructure projects and, probably, a thriving
market for takeout financing. This confluence is unlikely in the next year or so,
and we would avoid the stock despite the inexpensive valuations.



Hathway Cable & Datacom 􀂃 Presence in CAS areas positions as leading digital player:: Macquarie Research

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Hathway Cable & Datacom
􀂃 We recently met with the management of Hathway (HATH IN) to understand
the outlook for the Indian cable players, business drivers of the company, and
its positioning vs. the offerings of other vendors.
􀂃 The company is promoted by the Raheja group, and global media
conglomerate Newscorp holds a 16% stake in the company.
Presence in CAS areas positions as leading digital player
􀂃 Over 1 million digital cable subscribers. Hathway is one of the largest
cable TV providers in the country, having a subscriber base of ~8.5m. The
company’s digital subscriber base stands at close to 1.4m – representing 18%
of its subs base. This is higher than that of its closest competitor Den
Networks (DEN IN, Rs42, NR), which has 7% of its subscriber base on a
digital platform. The reason for this performance is Hathway’s strong position
in the Mumbai and Delhi markets, which have been CAS compliant since
2007.
􀂃 Revenue mix equally split between subs and carriage & placement. Like
most cable operators, Hathway has equal revenue share flowing in from
subscription revenues from customers and carriage and placement fees
charged to TV broadcasters. Though the digitisation theme is likely to play out
for cable operators as well, we think the pressure on carriage and placement
fees might hurt the profitability of the cable operators.
Bundling strategy might not yield desired result
􀂃 Low broadband penetration offer opportunity… India’s internet penetration
is extremely low at ~2%. Hathway believes that it is in a unique position to
provide both TV and internet services by leveraging the last mile connectivity.
We recognise the latent demand for internet services, but do not think the
bundling strategy is an effective marketing tool to increase digital cable uptick.
􀂃 …but dilutes the focus on cable in capital scarce market. The other point
of contention with broadband expansion is prioritising the use of cash in
difficult markets. For digital cable to flourish in India, we believe the
consolidation of LCOs (Local Cable Operators) and the seeding of set top
boxes is crucial.
􀂃 Balance sheet cushioned from IPO cash infusion. Hathway raised
Rs4.8bn from its IPO in February 2010. The company has spent Rs113m on
customer acquisitions and Rs7bn on digital capex. The current net cash on
the balance sheet stands at ~Rs1bn.
Risks & valuation
􀂃 Scale advantage of DTH players missing. Hathway has one of the largest
cable subscriber bases in the industry. Even so, at 1.4m digital customers, the
DTH operators have established a commendable lead in the space. We
recognise that the valuation differential between Dish TV (DITV IN, Rs81.45,
Outperform, TP: Rs95.00) (16x FY12E EV/EBITDA) and Hathway (6x
EV/EBITDA, based on Bloomberg estimates) is stark, but we believe that the
industry structure favours the DTH platform.

Sterlite Industries- Sharp correction more in sync with parent, not LME ::JPMorgan

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 What is the stock pricing in at current price of sub and itself? Based
on HZL (NR) mcap, STLT’s 65% holding is valued at Rs340B, while its
own market cap (diluted) stands at Rs427B, implying that investors are
valuing the overseas zinc assets (for which STLT paid $1.3B), copper
smelter, and 51% holding in BALCO, for a total of $1.9B. At current
commodity prices, the above earnings imply 3x EV/EBITDA for the
above assets.
 Zero value for the aluminum and power investments: This does not
include the $3.3B investment (equity + debt) in aluminum and power, as
essentially the market is viewing these as loss-making entities for the
foreseeable future. The recent correction in spot alumina and China’s
sharply increasing domestic production is something we would closely
watch as it could provide some relief for the aluminum subsidiary.
 What is the zinc segment pricing in? At current LME zinc prices, the
zinc subsidiary is trading at 5x, while at long-term zinc prices
($2000/MT), it is trading at 6.1x EV/EBITDA. On current commodity
prices, STLT’s EPS would drop to Rs18/21 for FY12E/13E from current
JPMe of Rs21/24 while on LT commodity prices, it would fall to
Rs16.5/17.
 STLT pricing in further support for aluminum, lack of access to
zinc segment cash: STLT’s stock has corrected in sync with parent VED
(down 26% since the end of July, compared to 31% for VED). Given the
strong volume growth in zinc and silver, we believe the recent correction
indicates the market’s concerns about an increase in support to aluminum
entities (currently loss-making) as parent VED’s leverage increases after
the CAIRN acquisition, while at the same time gives a steep discount to
zinc subsidiary, indicating market’s concerns on lack of access to cash at
the subsidiary. We believe these concerns are overdone and STLT can
access the cash (if required) via dividends. Management did on the
conference call indicate that its investment into VAL would be limited to
its holding (~30%). Zinc and aluminum prices are near to their long-term
averages and thus earnings downside looks limited for STLT.

Global Auto Horizons August 2011 :: Macquarie Research

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Global Auto Horizons
August 2011
This month, we have cut our European and Japanese earnings estimates to
reflect lower top-down assumptions, and we lower our ratings on Daimler and
Honda, from Outperform to Neutral in both cases. Given heightened macro risks,
we are not bullish on global autos as a group. However, we find value in a
number of names that have recently fallen in price, as long as our base-case
scenario holds that the US downturn doesn’t evolve into a deep and prolonged
recession and emerging markets remain robust.
Unfolding debt crisis in Europe and recession risks in US
Due to rising macro uncertainty and the unfolding of the debt crisis in Europe
and the US, we cut our developed-world volume forecasts. For 2011, we cut our
forecasts for Western Europe and US by 3% apiece. In Japan, we raise our
assumption by 12% due to a faster-than-expected recovery from the earthquakerelated
production disruption. For 2012, we reduce our volume expectations for
Western Europe, USA and Japan by 6%, 4% and 5%, respectively.
We also took a more cautious stance on commercial vehicles in Western Europe
and the US. Our 2011 estimates are unchanged, but we lower our forecasts by
8% and 13% for 2012, respectively, and by 19% and 16% for 2013, respectively.
Among emerging markets, we cut our 2011 and 2012 Brazilian assumptions by
2% and 4%, respectively. But we leave our assumptions unchanged for other
markets, having reduced our Indian and Chinese forecasts a month ago.
Earnings estimates coming down in Europe and Japan
More cautious volume and pricing assumptions as well as less favourable FX
assumptions (especially the strong yen) had a negative impact on the earnings
estimates for our European and Japanese coverage. On average, we reduce our
EBIT estimates for the European auto sector by 10% for 2012 and by 14% for
2013, while the expected operating profitability for the Japanese OEMs and
suppliers came down by 9% for FY3/12 and by 18% for FY3/13.
This month’s highlighted stocks
Stocks we like: BMW is attractive due to its strong product pipeline and cost
savings momentum until 2013. We believe consensus is underestimating an
operating leverage-driven margin recovery at Toyota, while Aisin Seiki is
expected to benefit from a significant recovery in Toyota’s global production this
quarter as supplier production leads final sales by 6-8 weeks. Hyundai Mobis
has strong defensive characteristics due to its after-parts business. Mahindra &
Mahindra has a robust product pipeline and exposure to rural Indian markets
where demand remains resilient. Great Wall remains the local-brand leader in
China’s booming SUV market, leading to estimated 2011 volume growth of 37%.
Stocks we don’t like: Fiat faces weakness in core markets Italy and Brazil, and
we expect a rising Fiat-Chrysler conglomerate discount as macro uncertainty
increases. Risks on Mazda have risen, as we forecast a slide back into losses
and balance-sheet strain. We’re reviewing our estimates and target price on
BYD following disappointing 1H numbers that confirm our negative view. Maruti
Suzuki EBITDA margins remain pressured by rising interest rates, fuel prices
and competition squeezing volumes while materials and R&D costs rise.

3 Sept: IPO and NCD GMP; Grey Market Preimum

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Company Name
Offer Price (Rs)
Expected Listing Price Premium



Vaswani Ind.
52
Discount
Brooks Lab.
100
5 to 6
SRS Ltd.
58
 1 to 2
T. D. Power Systems
256 
Discount
Manappuram Finance
1000
Discount
Muthoot Finance
1000
0.5%